Abstract-We review a recently developed engineering control approach to attention, presenting detailed attention control function assignments to the wealth of brain modules experimentally observed. The control system is extended to include biasing by emotional valence, with qualitative analysis given of a range of emotion paradigms and more detailed simulation described for two further paradigms. The implications of these results for better understanding of the interaction of emotion and attention concludes the paper, and in particular gives a possible resolution of the question as to unaware versus aware processing of emotional material.
I. INTRODUCTION Attention is increasingly well studied in the human brain. It involves filtering out distracters from a desired target object or spatial location by amplification of the target representation in low-level cortices, as well as by inhibition of distracter representations. The mechanism of such manipulation is currently under intensive study. At the same time the interaction of attentive and emotion-based processing is also being studied, with some level of inhibition between the two being observed. These features impact on our understanding of the twin pillars of human information processing ('thinking' and 'feeling') as well as on incorporating emotions into artificial agents. They are also relevant for the development of artificial systems recognising emotions in humans (pursued by ERMIS [1] ). A control model of attention will be reviewed in this paper, and extended to the addition of valence as an emotional component. The model will be considered in the light of several paradigms. This will help underpin further discussion on understanding the interaction of emotion and attention.
II. ATTENTION
Numerous experiments in brain imaging have demonstrated that there is a network of cortical modules involved in goaldirected control of attention [2, 3] . There is some overlap of the network for attention controlled by external rapidly appearing inputs (so-called exogenous attention) and the topdown (endogenous) form controlled by internal goals [4, 5, 6] . The most important cortical components of this attention network have been proposed as being the parietal lobes (for perceptual processing), the anterior cingulate (for limbicbased intention), and the prefrontal cortex (for rules and templates for guiding response) [7] . A recent review [8] concluded "Attention-related activity in frontal and parietal areas does not reflect attention modulation of visually evoked response, rather it reflects the attention operations themselves." More recently ( [9] p 201), in their wide-ranging review of attention, concluded: "One system, which includes part of the intra-parietal cortex and superior frontal cortex, is involved in preparing and applying goal-directed (top-down) selection for stimuli and responses." However they point out that there is another overlapping network crucially involved in exogenous attention, including ventral components: the tempero-parietal junction and ventral frontal cortex, both in the right hemisphere, acting as a 'circuit breaker' for detecting attention to salient events. We may summarize the overall control feature of attention by a two-network model:
CONTROLLING NETWORK OF MODULES 4.
(1) CONTROLLED NETWORK OF MODULES The lower modules in (1) are regions of the brain controlled by attention, consisting of lower regions especially in occipital, temporal and motor cortex, in which input or response activities are modulated by attention, but these areas do not function so as to control attention in any strong manner (barring areas, such as the amygdala, which code for input valence, so affecting where attention is directed). The upper modules in (1), termed the 'controller', create the attention control signal itself. They are composed of 'higher' areas, especially the prefrontal and parietal areas of cortex.
Attention has been modelled in a variety of ways: as a filter [10] or as a mechanism to bind together different pre-attentive components of objects [11] . More detailed models of its mechanics have been in terms of 'biased competition' on lower cortical sites, the bias arising from top-down goal sites [12] , and by more detailed neural network models of such biasing [13, 14, 15] . These models come under an engineering control approach [16, 17, 18, 19] , which we now review.
Given that attention functions by signals, generated by a separate control region, sent to modulate the neural activity in controlled regions, as in (1), the creation of such modulation itself will involve internal complexity. The variety of distinct functional components in engineering control models (goal sites, forward models or observers, inverse model controllers, error monitors) leads one to expect a similar range of functions being performed by the component brain areas observed in attention. The network of cortical modules for overall attention control (prefrontal, parietal), as well as the cortical recipient sites of the control signals needed to achieve the filtering process basic to attention from the higher-level sites, are ripe for analysis by engineering control concepts.
Effective control proceeds by creating suitable control signals to influence the 'plant' (being controlled) so that it develops in time through a desired set of states. We can identify, for attention, the plant as the lower level cortices on figure I is the presence of the IMC as separate from the goal map and from the underlying plant (low-level cortical) module. There is strong evidence for this separation from [9] , with sites in Pre-Frontal Cortex (PFC) as well as parietal lobe being involved in cued attention movement. Since the PFC has goal-like properties, we can safely assume that the parietal sites involved IMC-like activity. [16] [17] [18] [19] r dV(r)ldt = -V(r) + w*A V(r)) + I(r) (2) where V(r) is the membrane potential of neurons at site r, * denote convolution over the neural module, w(r, r') is the lateral connectivity kernel, and I(r) is external input. This latter has been taken additive in (2), but this must be modified for attention feedback from some higher module to the plant, if it is not purely a base-line shift. In general there is some form of multiplicative amplification. This has been investigated in the model (2) [20, 21] to show that there is a multiplicative effect of gain control [22, 25] . A possible mechanism for this arises from the effect of acetycholine (ACh) on inter-neurons in cortex as modifying the spread of inhibition [23, 24] . More generally ACh acts, at nicotinic receptors nAChRs, by causing Ca ion influx and thereby amplifying the effects of the usual range of transmitters (glutamate, GABA, etc). This leads to a contrast gain action of attention, although not yet with the feedback specificity observed; we consider this elsewhere. We should note a recent study adds to the interest in ACh for attention [26] showing region-specific modulation effects of ACh on both attention and emotion in extra-striate CX, amplifying responses to fearful faces at attended or unattended locations.
IV Brain imaging/deficit results in depressives indicate the division of processing into: a ventral network (for emotion) and a dorsal one (for cognition), where imbalance between the two leads to reduction of the cognitive activity and an excess of limbic activity. This leads to the question as to the nature of the interaction between emotion and attention: are they competing control systems, or is attention the main control system, but guided by emotional valence? To answer that we will develop an architecture for their interaction by extending the sensory-motor attention control model of figure  1 and the discussion of the previous section.
We start with the amygdala, a particularly important site for fast valuation of stimuli, which it is able to achieve by being reciprocally well-coupled to posterior as well as anterior cortical sites. Thus the amygdala can bias attention by added activation, in particular for stimuli with negative valence. A further important component is the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC), which has been observed in interaction with dorsal PFC sites of endogenous attention. We take the model of Mayberg [34] to include an inhibitory interaction between these two components (OFC & DLPFC).
The overall attention/emotion network can thus be constructed as shown in figure 2. We have delineated in figure 2 the two attention circuits discussed in section 2, as well as including the amygdala and OFC. Further modules (hypothalamus, striatal components) are also involved but their role is beyond this paper. The question raised earlier can be rephrased in terms of the diagram of A related question, still controversial, is as to the need for attention to an emotionally-laden stimulus to cause amygdala activation; presently it appears as if that is the case [31] . In other words, expression of the valence of a stimulus requires attention to it.
Let us look at the overall connectivity between the three circuits (dorsal and ventral attention and limbic circuits), using the results from these various experiments, to explore the architecture of figure 2 further: I) AMYG is excitatorily reciprocally connected to CX, so to both ventral and dorsal attention circuits. It has fast activation from posterior sites in stimulus processing, which may allow its early sending of a valence tag to these sites, and to the ventral or dorsal sites of attention control IMCs in parietal lobes [9] . There is also evidence on amygdala-based boosting of attention resources, as detected in the emotional attentional blink [32] ; a simulation ofthis effect is presented in [33] ; 2) OFC is mainly excitatorily coupled to the PFC component of the ventral attention circuit (not shown in the figure), but inhibitorily coupled to the dorsal partner [29] , although the inhibitory or excitatory character of these connections is not rigid, so they have not been denoted only one or the other.
With these additional features, together with results on depression from [34] we conclude that the lower-level emotion circuit of figure 2 normally functions as an additional valence tagging system for the ventral circuit, so leading to enhanced circuit-breaking of the dorsal attention control system. It achieves this, we propose, not only by activating the ventral components (especially the goal sites in ventral PFC) but also reducing, by inhibition, cognitive goals present in DLPFC. In depression, cognitive goals are unable to be effective in normal situations, due to continued inhibition from the OFC hyper-activity.
Let us now qualitatively discuss several experimental paradigms used in constructing the architecture of figure 2, to check that the architecture is able to explain these findings. a) The first of these [31] used fMRI to measure whole brain activity when subjects viewed pictures of fearful, neutral or happy faces under a difficult divided attention condition to either the face or to comparing the orientation ofperipherallyplaced bars (the faces were presented in the centre of vision, which was fixated by the subjects). Amygdala was only observed active under attention to the emotionally-charged faces (with stronger effects in right amygdala from fearful 1665 L OFC than for happy faces). The face ventral temporal lobe area was also activated by attention, again more strongly by fearful faces, as also occurred in the OFC/ventral PFC. They noted effects of modulation by amygdala on a number of these cortical sites: ventral PFC, OFC, and early visual cortex. The architecture of figure 2 explains these modulation effects, provided there is a stronger coding of fearful face in the left AMYG. A more recent simulation using the architecture of figure 2 shows very good agreement with experimental data, as seen in figure 3 (for left amygdala) . b) The second paradigm [29] studied the effects of novel distracting scenes of different levels of emotional arousal. The results for the amygdala were already quantitatively modelled in a simplified version of the architecture of figure 2, only containing the AMYG in addition to the dorsal attention system [35] . We can qualitatively fit the different inferior (IFG) and middle frontal gyrus (MFG) activations by the extended architecture of figure 2. The IFG data show activation to the emotionally novel stimuli, as expected from the fast AMYG activation of the ventral attention goal systems, as well as the reduced activation from target (neutral) stimuli, coded as cognitive goals in the MFG inhibiting the IFG. Conversely the MFG has enhanced activity for the cognitive target stimuli, but reduced activity for the emotionally-valenced stimuli; this again arises from the proposed reciprocal inhibition between the OFC and IFG towards the MFG. c) The third case [30] gives further indication of the reciprocal inhibition between the DLPFC and the OFC. The paradigm used picture stimuli with an initial single picture cue and a later probe of nine pictures. In a working memory task a target to respond to in the probe by a button press was a picture contained in the previous cue. In DLPFC the signal intensity reduced increasingly between the pleasant, neutral and unpleasant stimuli during the delay period between the cue and the probe. In OFC there variation was exactly the converse. This is exactly what would be expected from the architecture of figure 2, with mutual inhibition between OFC and DLPFC, and a larger strength of activity representing fearful as compared to neutral as compared to e) The fifth condition [27] [33] were obtained using the full CODAM control model of attention [16 -19] , with an additional emotional coding bias in the amygdala. As seen in the comparison of the ERP results between figures 4 and 5, the emotional bias gives an advantage to the P3 of T2, but with earlier biases in prior ERPs for T2, so explaining how such emotional bias may arise initially outside the attention control system, but leads to a bias of attention to cause T2 more easily to come into awareness.
The main attention mechanism we employed was the feedback amplification of the relevant object activity, on the object map, by the attention control signal so as to help boost this activity to enter its working memory (WM) site and thereby reach a threshold for report and awareness. An important role in this was played by the corollary discharge (cd) of the attention movement control signal from the IMC; this cd signal was used as an early boost for the signal to gain its WM site. At the same time the error. monitor used the cd signal also to boost the IMC attention amplification, so leading to a 'scarce resource' character for attention. This is part of the CODAM (COrollary Discharge of Attention Movement) control model of attention [16] [17] [18] [19] . V. FEELING
In conclusion we can see that the architecture of figure 2 qualitatively explains the results of a set of 5 important experimental paradigms on the effectiveness of emotionallyvalenced stimuli to break through into dorsally-controlled attention, using the ventrally-controlled attention circuit as well as direct inhibition from OFC to DLPFC. The qualitative explanation has been followed by a more careful quantitative set of simulation results [33] , together with a detailed simulation of the important emotional attentional blink.
A model of the creation of emotional feeling may be thereby developed through the attention control approach by identifying the sources of ownership and content of awareness as arising from the corollary discharge and object buffer sites respectively. The source of content for feeling would then be in the limbic component of figure 2, in addition to feedback effects from physiological changes in the body and over cortical regions from amygdala modulation [35] .
From this point of view we can cast light on the controversy over the 'standard' view of emotion processing, that emotions can occur without attention being paid, as compared to the opposite view that only under attention can emotion valence be activated, for example in amygdala [3 1] . We see that the interaction of attention and emotion is complex, with unaware emotion stimuli being processed, for example in amygdala, but providing a bias to the resulting attention control machinery to bring the emotional stimulus into awareness in a working memory site if the valence of the stimulus is strong enough. Thus emotion here is seen as a breakthrough bias in the machinery of cognitive processing under attention. As such emotion plays thereby a crucial role in bringing the values of the external world into the internal cognitive milieu created in our brains.
VI. CONCLUSIONS We have reviewed a control approach to attention which allows the detailed assignment of various control functions to separate components of the network of sites observed in the brain during attention paradigms. The way acetylcholine helps to achieve attention amplification of targets and inhibition of distracters was then considered briefly. Emotions were then folded into the attention control model by adding amygdala and orbito-frontal components. The interactions of these sites with the separate ventral (exogenous) and dorsal (endogenous) attention networks was considered, and used to analyse several experimental paradigms in which the interactions of emotion and attention were evaluated.
The overall conclusion is that it is not possible to consider emotion processing without inclusion of attention, and conversely that emotion functions importantly to help guide attention, and can be initially processed without attention..
